In a desperate attempt to bridge budget deficits, state legislatures have slashed spending and are looking for sources of additional revenue. "Sin taxes"-taxes on culturally disfavored products and activitiesconstitute one such source. Sin taxes have historically been limited to alcohol, tobacco, and gambling. 2 Several state legislatures have already increased taxes on these traditional sin tax targets, or signaled their intent to do so, to help reduce their fiscal 2. See William F. Shughart II, The Economics of the Nanny State, in TAXING CHOICE: THE PREDATORY POLITICS OF FISCAL DISCRIMINATION 13, 20-24 (William F. Shughart II ed., 1997) (discussing historical use of sin taxes on such products as alcohol and tobacco to correct for negative externalities associated with use of such products). Although gambling has traditionally been included as a sin tax target, this Article will focus on the taxation of harmful products, particularly tobacco, rather than harmful activities such as gambling.
deficits. 3 Given the extent of current economic troubles, however, increasing taxes on these traditional targets alone will not fix the financial problems existing in many states. Consequently, some state legislatures are considering whether to expand sin taxes to cover previously untaxed products such as high-sugar drinks, 4 internet pornography, 5 and even marijuana. 6 As state legislatures debate whether or not to increase existing sin taxes, enact new ones, or both, they need to recognize that reliance on sin taxes comes with a troubling ethical issue: when a state becomes dependent on sin tax revenues to finance essential governmental programs and services, the state creates a conflict of interest between the protection of its citizens' health and the need for continued sales of harmful products. 7 In effect, a state's dependence on sin tax revenues aligns the interests of the state with those of the producer of the "sinful" product in maintaining sales of the product. The state may itself become the sinner-seeking to maximize its revenue at the expense of its citizens' health.
This potential alignment of interest between the state and the producer of harmful products is readily illustrated by the states' dependence on tobacco revenues. States have become "addicted" to tobacco payments. They depend on tobacco revenues for purposes ranging from infrastructure improvements to education. 8 The states' reliance on tobacco revenues has been widely recognized. 9 Less well known, however, is that the states' addiction to tobacco revenues and the conflict of interest it creates are exacerbated by the terms of the 1998 settlement agreement between the states and the 7. Whether a state has an affirmative obligation to protect its citizens' health by regulating the use of harmful products is a matter of fundamental debate. The details of that debate need not be considered in this Article, however, because the moral hazard resulting from a state's dependence on sin tax revenues exists even if the state is subject only to the less controversial obligation of not profiting from the sale of harmful products to its citizens.
8. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-534T, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: STATES' ALLOCATIONS OF PAYMENTS FROM TOBACCO COMPANIES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000 THROUGH 2005 , at 3 (2007 , available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07534t.pdf (stating that infrastructure and education allocations from tobacco payments were among largest, after allocations for health care and budget shortfalls).
9. See Stephanie Saul, Government Gets Hooked on Tobacco Tax Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2008, at WK3 (discussing extent to which state and federal governments rely on revenue from taxes on tobacco). tobacco companies, known as the "Master Settlement Agreement" or "MSA." 10 Under the MSA, if cigarette sales drop, not only do the states collect less revenue, they may in fact be required to pay back to the tobacco companies substantial amounts of previously received settlement payments. 11 This is more than a theoretical possibility. The states and the tobacco companies are presently engaged in litigation over whether the states will be required to return to the tobacco companies as much as $5.3 billion in previous settlement payments. 12 A decision in favor of the tobacco companies would place already cash-strapped states in an even deeper fiscal hole. Consider the perverse incentive confronting state policymakers who stand to lose up to billions of dollars if they enact legislation that reduces cigarette consumption. Perhaps this provides part of the explanation for why states have grossly underfunded their smoking prevention and cessation programs. 13 Taxes on harmful products have existed almost since the country's founding, and the debate over the virtues and vices of sin taxes is just as old. 14 Most of the debate has focused on whether sin taxes effectively generate revenue and motivate healthy lifestyle choices, or whether they regressively burden those individuals least able to afford them. 15 These previously debated pros and cons of sin taxes remain relevant and warrant reconsideration. That said, perhaps because states have never before relied as heavily on sin tax revenues as they do now, earlier articles have failed to examine thoroughly the conflict of interest that results when a state becomes dependent on the 10. A copy of the Master Settlement Agreement is available through the National Association of Attorneys General website at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msapdf/MSA%20with %20Sig%20Pages%20and%20Exhibits.pdf/file_view. The Master Settlement Agreement is referred to and cited throughout this article as the "MSA."
11. continued sale of harmful products to its citizens. This Article considers that conflict of interest and suggests possible ways to mitigate it.
Part I reviews the traditional arguments for and against the imposition of sin taxes. Part II examines the alignment of financial interests between the states and the sellers of products subject to sin taxes by discussing the states' dependence on tobacco revenues. After establishing the states' dependence on tobacco revenues, Part II analyzes in detail how the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement exacerbate the states' conflict of interest between protecting citizens' health and protecting revenue through continued cigarette sales. Part III discusses two alternatives that states should consider when enacting sin taxes: earmarking sin tax revenues to combat the problems caused by the taxed product, and securitizing sin tax revenues. These alternatives would eliminate, or at least mitigate, the conflict of interest identified above. Part IV concludes the Article.
II. THE DEBATE OVER SIN TAXES
Sin taxes engender fierce debate. Much of this debate has focused on the effectiveness and fairness of sin taxes and on whether governments should use their taxing power to modify behavior. Proponents see sin taxes as a means of raising revenue that at the same time provides financial incentives for individuals to discontinue harmful or self-destructive behaviors. Opponents contend that sin taxes unduly interfere with individual liberties and fall disproportionately on the individuals least able to bear additional financial burdens. This section sets forth several of the arguments most commonly heard for and against the imposition of sin taxes. These arguments generally fail to address the ethical conflict of interest created when states become dependent on sin tax revenues.
A. Common Arguments in Support of Sin Taxes
Sin tax proponents typically fall into two categories: those looking to generate revenue for the state and those seeking to improve public health. Commentators have discussed which of these goals-money or health-constitutes the real motivation for sin taxes, 16 but proponents of the taxes typically rely on both when arguing for their cause. Sin tax proponents also contend that sin taxes are necessary to fairly allocate the costs of using the harmful, taxed products (for example, increased health care costs and loss of productivity). Finally, sin tax advocates point to the popularity of the taxes as a justification for their enactment.
Sin Taxes Raise Revenues
Because the demand for products subject to sin taxes is relatively inelastic, taxes on those products are effective sources of revenue generation. For example, experts estimate that a 10% increase in the cost of cigarettes will cause only a 3-6% decline in 16 . See Shughart, supra note 2, at 24 ("The fact that [sin] taxes also raise revenue is in theory of secondary importance to the promotion of virtue. But revenue is never inconsequential to government in practice.").
consumption. 17 According to these experts, even though an increase in the tobacco tax may cause some smokers to stop smoking, the overall result of the tax increase will be a net gain in tax revenues. 18 The relative inelasticity in the demand for cigarettes indicates that the addictive power of nicotine outweighs the increased "pain" the average smoker experiences from having to pay more for a pack of cigarettes.
Indisputably, past revenues from tobacco have been significant. The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids estimates that between 2000 and 2009 total state tobacco revenues exceeded $200 billion. 19 One study indicates that in fiscal year 2008 alone the states reaped over $15.6 billion in cigarette excise tax revenues and $8.2 billion in tobacco settlement payments. 20 The substantial revenues raised from tobacco products have prompted many states to consider expanding sin taxes to other popular but unhealthy products. The potential revenue from those new sin tax targets appears promising. For example, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that a federal excise tax of 3 cents per 12-ounce can of "sugar-sweetened" beverages would generate an estimated $24 billion in tax revenue over the 2009-2013 period, and about $50 billion over the 2009-2018 period. 21 Given the prevailing economic difficulties governments currently face, revenue sources such as these constitute tempting targets for cash-poor state governments.
Sin Taxes Improve Health, Particularly Among the Most Vulnerable
Somewhat contrary to the first justification for sin taxes (that demand for harmful products is relatively inelastic and therefore a stable source of revenue), advocates for sin taxes also justify imposition of the taxes by arguing that the price increase caused by taxing the harmful product reduces consumption of the product and encourages a more healthy lifestyle. 22 Moreover, the likelihood that a sin tax will cause a person either to cease or not to start his or her use of a harmful product may be higher for populations that are more sensitive to economic pressures, such as the young, the poor, and minorities. 23 Studies have found that demand elasticity for cigarettes is higher for low-income populations. 24 This means that as prices increase, members of these groups are less likely to purchase cigarettes. In addition, these groups may be more vulnerable to information asymmetries. 25 Therefore, making it more difficult to use harmful products by increasing their cost offers additional protection to low-income individuals who might otherwise fall prey to misleading or exploitive advertising techniques. 26 
Sin Taxes Fairly Allocate Negative Externalities
Proponents also argue that sin taxes help to properly allocate costs resulting from the use of harmful products, since those costs should be borne by the individuals who choose to use the products rather than by society as a whole. 27 The health care costs associated with smoking exemplify the potential negative externalities caused by use of a harmful product. 28 Measuring the cost of smoking is difficult. A study prepared by medical economists in 1993 and cited in numerous Centers for Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC") publications estimated the cost of health care expenditures relating to smoking at $50 billion that year. 29 Another study five years later by a researcher at the University of California, Berkeley concluded that smoking-related medical expenditures cost slightly over $72 billion per year to treat. 30 Most recently, a CDC health win that reduces smoking and saves lives; a financial win that raises revenue and reduces health care costs; and a political win that is popular with the public.").
23 Without tobacco taxes, these costs would be spread across both smokers and nonsmokers in the form of increased Medicare and Medicaid expenses. 32 Sin tax proponents argue that spreading this cost across society generally is inequitable since non-smokers have done nothing to cause the medical problems that result from smoking. 33 Imposing a tobacco tax makes it more likely that the government will receive money to defray smoking-related medical expenses from the same individuals who cause the government to incur those expenses, smokers. 34
Sin Taxes Are More Politically Acceptable than Other Taxes
While political pressures may render many tax increases unfeasible, taxes on harmful products are generally more acceptable because they fall on a minority of the population, users of the harmful product who "voluntarily" elect to pay the tax when they purchase the product. Popular support for sin taxes is demonstrated by the success of ballot initiatives in numerous states to increase tobacco taxes.
In 33. See H.J. Cummins, The Popular but Paradoxical 'Sin Tax' Spurs Controversy, NEWSDAY, Jan. 31, 1993, at 77 (noting that proponents believe sin taxes are "a fair levy against people whose habits lead to such things as lung cancer and drunk driving accidents, expensive problems to society as a whole").
34. See infra Section II.B.4 for a discussion refuting the contention that smoking imposes a net cost on society.
35 support. 39 Despite the defeat of the proposed tax increase, the percentage of voters willing to increase taxes demonstrated the political feasibility of sin taxes.
B. Common Arguments Against Sin Taxes
Opponents to sin taxes contend that the taxes are inefficient and unfair. They argue that the taxes fail to achieve their revenue-raising goals, violate standards of vertical equity by disproportionately impacting lower-income groups, and unfairly target politically unpopular minority groups (i.e., users of the taxed products). Sin tax opponents contend that users of the taxed products already bear the costs associated with using the products, and therefore increases in sin taxes are unjustified. Moreover, opponents consider the government's attempt to modify behavior by imposing taxes an unwelcomed intrusion into the realm of personal decision making. Finally, sin tax opponents argue that the health improvement justification for the taxes is often disingenuous, and that the real reason for imposing the taxes is the state's insatiable appetite for revenue. 40
Sin Taxes Fail to Achieve Revenue Goals and May in Some Instances Actually Reduce Revenues
Even with relatively inelastic demand, sin tax opponents argue that if tax levels are increased too much, demand will drop and along with it so will sales of the "sinful" product. If sales drop enough, tax revenues will actually decrease despite higher tax rates. 41 The "tipping point" for when taxes overburden consumers and cause a net drop in tax revenues has been reached in at least one instance. When New Jersey increased its cigarette tax by 17.5 cents per pack in 2007, cigarette tax revenues actually fell by $22 million as compared to pre-tax increase levels. 42 Even if tax increases do not result in a net revenue loss, states imposing high sin taxes might not collect the full amount of tax revenue they expect because consumers find both legal and illegal alternatives to purchase the product at a lower cost. The highest total cigarette tax burden in the United States is in New York City. 43 The combined state and city taxes on a pack of cigarettes sold in New York City increases the price by $4.25 ($2.75 in state tax; $1.50 in city tax), 44 45 A 2006 study found that this high tax burden caused New York smokers to shift to lower-priced and untaxed cigarettes (purchased online or at Native American reservations) as ways to reduce their overall cigarette costs. 46 The study concluded that New York State lost between $436 million and $576 million in tax revenue in 2004 as a result of consumers purchasing low-priced (mainly untaxed) cigarettes. 47 Other studies have shown the same result: increased tobacco taxes cause consumers to change their purchasing habits in ways that may ultimately result in lower tobacco tax revenues. 48 
Sin Taxes Are Regressive
In addition to arguing that sin taxes produce a diminishing revenue stream (the more states tax, the less revenue they actually receive), opponents of sin taxes also deride the taxes as regressive. 49 Simply stated by one author, a "sin tax, like any flat point-of-sale tax, will consume a greater proportion of a poorer person's income, and is thus automatically regressive." 50 A 1994 study found that, at that time, "the cigarette tax percentage of the median income of smokers ranges from 0.4 percent for those who make $50,000 or more to a percentage amount that is almost 13 times as great-5.1 percent for those who make less than $10,000." 51 Based on this finding, the study's author concluded that "[c]igarette taxes are strikingly regressive." 52 A 2006 CDC study reported that a majority of all smokers in the United States come from families with incomes of less than $35,000, while less than 15% of smokers come from families with incomes over $75,000. 53 increases in tobacco taxes fall disproportionately on individuals from lower income homes.
Sin tax opponents reject the contention that higher prices make it more likely that lower income individuals will quit their harmful habit. 54 Instead, they argue that "while tobacco taxes encourage people to quit smoking, those people are most likely to be from the middle-and upper-income brackets . . . . [which] means an already regressive tax actually grows more regressive over time, as more middle-and upper-income people quit, while lower-income people continue to smoke." 55 3. Sin Taxes Are Discriminatory As explained above, sin taxes are more politically acceptable than most other tax alternatives because they significantly impact only a minority of people: heavy users of the product subject to the tax. 56 Economists have found that the "political support for an excise tax rises as the per cent of the population consuming the base falls." 57 As a result, sin taxes "often have great popular support" because "the majority either does not consume the product at all, or consumes such a small share such that their aggregate tax price is small relative to the minority." 58 Opponents of sin taxes contend that placing a tax burden on a minority group because it is politically feasible to do so is exploitive and should be avoided as a matter of fairness. 59 As stated by one group opposing an increase in federal tobacco taxes, "a politically popular and expensive program [in this case the State Children's Health Insurance Program] should never be funded by a small, low-income, politically unpopular minority like cigarette smokers." 60 4. Some Sins Actually Save the State Money While sin tax proponents argue that taxes force users of harmful products to internalize the costs of those products rather than spread the cost across society more broadly, 61 opponents argue that sin tax revenue may actually exceed those healthrelated costs. These sin tax opponents find support for their position in multiple studies regarding the cost of cigarette smoking.
54. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument by sin tax proponents that such taxes protect low-income individuals by motivating them to quit using the harmful products.
55 For example, a 1994 study by a Duke University economist concluded that "current cigarette taxes exceed the magnitude of the estimated net externalities." 62 The study reached this conclusion based on data showing that:
[T]otal medical expenditures due to smoking are reduced by offsetting reductions in costs because of premature death. A person who dies from a smoking related disease causes an increase in medical cost at that time, but medical costs are decreased in the future because that person does not suffer the illnesses otherwise suffered during a longer life. Similarly, smokers who die prematurely lose retirement benefits in the form of social security, which is a financial saving for the government (since the smokers are generally alive during the contribution period). 63 Based on smokers' early deaths, the study found savings of almost $35 billion per year for the federal government and almost $10 billion per year for state governments. 64 A subsequent study of the Dutch population likewise found that smokers actually saved their government money by dying early. 65 While being careful to acknowledge the human suffering caused by smoking-related illnesses, 66 opponents of tobacco taxes have cited these studies to argue against further cigarette tax increases. 67 
Sin Taxes Open the Door to Broader Government Intervention
Consumption decisions are inherently personal. Opponents of sin taxes contend that each individual should have the freedom to determine whether the benefits he or she derives from the use of a product outweigh the detrimental health effects caused by the product. 68 Government intrusion into this decision-making process, through the imposition of excessive taxes on the product, amounts to an unwelcome paternalism that infringes on personal liberties.
Those opposing sin taxes often ask, "What's next?" 69 If sin taxes apply to cigarettes and alcohol, might they not also be extended to fatty foods or to other personal lifestyle decisions-like the decision to sit idly and watch TV? To opponents of sin taxes, the extension of government involvement into areas personal in nature such as whether one decides to eat doughnuts or watch re-runs of The traditional arguments over sin taxes focus on economic and health effects, as well as government's role in influencing individual consumption decisions. They generally ignore the fact that sin taxes create an inherent conflict of interest for the state. On the one hand, states seek to protect their citizens' health. 71 On the other, once a state imposes sin taxes, it stands to profit from the continued sale of a product detrimental to its citizens' health. Any reduction in the consumption of the "sinful" product will result in a loss of revenue for the state. This conflict of interest is even more troubling if the state relies on the sin tax revenues to fund essential government services. Once such reliance occurs, the state has an interest in protecting the continued financial success of the producers of the harmful product.
Nowhere is this conflict of interest more apparent than in the states' dependence on tobacco revenues. States receive tobacco-related revenues from two sources: tobacco excise taxes and payments from tobacco companies under the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement. 72 In 2008, the states received $15.6 billion in tobacco tax revenues. 73 They received an additional $8.2 billion in MSA payments from the tobacco companies. 74 Given the states' use of this money for essential governmental purposes, the states have become dependent on continued tobacco revenues and therefore susceptible to a conflict of interest between protecting a necessary revenue source and protecting their citizens' health. This conflict of interest is magnified by the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement, which compound the reduction in state tobacco revenues if the major tobacco companies lose sales volume and market share. As we shall see, if certain preconditions are met, including the loss of sales volume and market share, the states may be required to pay billions of dollars back to the companies.
A. The States' Dependence on Tobacco Revenues
Tracking how states allocate their tobacco tax revenues is difficult, since in many states those revenues are added to the general fund rather than specifically earmarked. In contrast, the Government Accountability Office has tracked how states spend their MSA revenues for several years. 76 The states' allocation of MSA revenues shows their dependence on the continued receipt of payments from the tobacco companies. Before looking at that allocation, however, some background about the MSA is helpful.
Background on the Master Settlement Agreement
On November 23, 1998, the four largest U.S. tobacco companies and forty-six states settled lawsuits brought by the states to recover costs incurred for the treatment of tobacco-related illnesses. 77 The settlement, known as the Master Settlement Agreement, released the states' legal claims against the companies. 78 In exchange, the companies agreed to make substantial annual payments and to restrict certain future conduct. 79 At the time the parties entered into the MSA, experts estimated that payments from the companies to the states for the first twenty-five years of the agreement would exceed $200 billion. 80 While the MSA itself is not technically an excise tax, it operates much like one in that (1) the companies subject to the MSA must make annual payments to the states; 81 (2) these payments are determined, in part, by the volume of cigarettes that the companies sell; 82 and (3) the companies have passed the cost of the settlement on to their consumers. 83 Therefore, although the MSA is a contractual agreement and not an excise tax, the lessons learned from the states' experiences with the MSA are still instructive in the excise tax context. 83. In 1998, prior to the MSA, the national average price for a pack of premium brand cigarettes was $2.29. ORZECHOWSKI & WALKER, supra note 20, at 150. The following year, after the major tobacco manufacturers entered into the MSA, the average price for the same premium brand cigarettes increased to $3.05. Id. at 152. This 33% increase has been attributed to the companies' obligations under the MSA. See THOMAS C. CAPEHART, JR., TRENDS IN THE CIGARETTE INDUSTRY AFTER THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 4 (U.S. Dep't of Agric., Electronic Outlook Report No. TBS-250-01, 2001), http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/tbs/oct01/tbs250-01/tbs250-01.pdf ("Cigarette prices surged 45 cents per pack on November 16, 1998, the day the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) was signed."); see also REDHEAD, supra note 72, summary, para. 1 ("Cigarette price increases have passed on [MSA] settlement costs to smokers.").
The States' Use of MSA Revenues
The MSA itself does not mandate how states should spend the revenues they receive under the settlement. Nevertheless, the agreement declares that the states' purposes for entering into the settlement included "reduc[ing] Youth smoking" and "promot[ing] the public health." 84 In addition, at the time of the agreement, several states' attorneys general announced that their states should use the settlement funds to address the problems created by smoking. 85 For example, Washington Governor Christine Gregoire, when she served as the state's attorney general, stated that "Washington state's proceeds from the tobacco industry settlement should be spent on public health issues or the integrity of the historic agreement will be violated." 86 Iowa Attorney General Tom Miller expressed his belief about how MSA funds should be used as follows: "I believe that the funds provided in this agreement should go primarily for various health purposes, ranging from specific education efforts to prevent tobacco use and addiction, to providing smoking cessation programs and health care for uninsured children in our state." 87 The states' actual use of MSA revenues has failed to live up to these lofty intentions. In 2007, the Government Accountability Office issued a report analyzing the states' use of MSA settlement funds from fiscal year 2000 through 2005. 88 According to the report, for the years under review, the states received $52.6 billion in MSA-related payments. 89 The states used the settlement proceeds for the following purposes: Thus, despite the promises made at the time the states signed the MSA, states have used the majority of tobacco settlement funds for purposes entirely unrelated to (1) the health problems created by cigarette smoking, or (2) smoking cessation programs. For the period under consideration in the GAO report, only 33.5% was spent on health care and tobacco control. 95 Most of the funds were instead used either for general government operations (such as making up budget shortfalls, construction of infrastructure projects, and education) or were saved for unallocated purposes. Considering the severe financial challenges now faced by the states, one can only assume that the percentage of tobacco revenues going toward "budget shortfalls" will most likely increase over the next several years. 96 Based on the amount of money received, the states' use of that money, and the extent of the current fiscal crisis, it is fair to conclude that the states have become dependent on MSA payments to continue funding essential governmental functions. Consequently, despite the potential harm to their citizens' health, it is in the states' interest (at least in the short term) to protect these payments and ensure that they continue. In essence, the states' ability to provide certain government services depends on the continued success of the tobacco companies, creating the perverse incentive for the states to protect these companies. This incentive is further compounded by the 92. "General purposes" include "amounts allocated for attorneys' fees and other items, such as law enforcement or community development, which could not be placed into a more precise category. This category also includes amounts allocated to a state's general fund that were not earmarked for any particular purpose." Id. at 13.
93. States' allocations do not match the payment amounts on an annual basis because states carried over funds from one year to the next and earned interest on their payments.
94. Percentages do not total to 100 due to rounding. 95. The spending for "health" purposes is not limited to tobacco-related health care. This category includes amounts allocated for direct health care services, health insurance, hospitals, medical technology, public health services, and health research. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 13. terms of the MSA, which penalize the states if the major tobacco companies experience a decline in cigarette sales and market share.
B. Penalty Provisions of the MSA Exacerbate the Conflict of Interest Caused by Dependence on Sin Taxes
By entering into the MSA, the states sought to "reduce Youth smoking" and "promote the public health." 97 Perhaps unwittingly, however, the states in fact aligned their financial interests with the continued success of the tobacco companies. Provisions in the MSA that reduce the amount of settlement payments if cigarette sales fall below specified levels, combined with the states' dependence on the revenue stream from the settlement payments, have created a strong incentive for the states to avoid a significant drop in cigarette sales. 98 If sales of a product subject to an excise tax drop, so do tax revenues. Although the MSA technically is not an excise tax, it contains a provision, known as the Volume Adjustment, which mimics this feature. 99 A second provision, the NPM Adjustment, actually multiplies the reduction in MSA payments if certain conditions, including a drop in nationwide cigarette sales, are met. 100 In addition, the method of allocating the NPM Adjustment among the states creates even further incentive for the states to protect cigarette sales. Based on the NPM Adjustment's allocation method, a single state could lose its entire MSA payment, perhaps for multiple years, if the NPM Adjustment applies to it. 101 These risks of reduced or completely eliminated MSA payments create a significant financial incentive for the states not to enact policies that could cause substantial drops in cigarette sales, such as the funding of smoking cessation and prevention programs. 102
The Volume Adjustment-A Linear Reduction in MSA Payments
The MSA calls for the tobacco companies that are parties to the agreement to make annual payments to the states on or before April 15 each year. 103 The base amount of these annual payments, known as the "Base Amount," is set out in the MSA as follows: $8,139,000,000 2018 and each year thereafter $9,000,000,000 The amount actually paid by the companies to the states differs from the Base Amount, however, because of various adjustments provided for in the MSA. One of these adjustments is the Volume Adjustment. 106 The Volume Adjustment reduces the amount owed by the companies to the states if the cigarette shipment volumes of the three largest tobacco companies drop below a specified "Base Volume," which is set as the number of cigarettes shipped by the major tobacco companies in 1997, the year before they entered into the MSA. 107 In other words, a drop in cigarette shipments by the major tobacco companies, when compared to the Base Volume, results in a decrease in the payment owed by the tobacco companies to the states.
The amount of the payment decrease is determined by a formula set out in the MSA. 108 The formula reduces the payment amount in proportion to the lost volume. For example, if nationwide cigarette shipments for the year of the payment have declined 10% (as compared to the Base Volume), the amount owed by the tobacco companies under the MSA would likewise be reduced by approximately 10%. 109 This proportionate reduction in payments owed as a result of lower sales places the states' financial interest on the same side as the tobacco manufacturers in maintaining cigarette sales. As explained in the next section, the MSA's NPM Adjustment heightens the alignment of the interests between the states and the tobacco companies by multiplying the reduction of MSA payments.
The NPM Adjustment-A Treble Threat to MSA Payments
The NPM Adjustment applies on a year-by-year basis to reduce tobacco companies' annual MSA payments if certain conditions are met. The reduction can be significant. As mentioned earlier, the states and tobacco companies are presently disputing whether the tobacco companies will receive as much as $5.3 billion of MSA 109. The Volume Adjustment would in fact reduce the payment amount by 9.8% if shipment volumes dropped 10%. This is because the Volume Adjustment formula contains a constant factor of 0.98, as shown in note 107. payments back from the states for NPM Adjustments relating to the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . 110 The NPM Adjustment is one of the more complex provisions of the MSA. To understand how it operates, some further background regarding the other basic terms of the MSA is necessary. This section gives a brief explanation of MSA terms relevant to the NPM Adjustment and then explains the operation of the NPM Adjustment.
i. Background to the NPM Adjustment
The MSA separates domestic tobacco manufacturers into two broad categories: Participating Manufacturers and Non-Participating Manufacturers. Participating Manufacturers are those tobacco companies that are signatories to the agreement. 111 They have agreed to be bound by the settlement's conduct restrictions and payment obligations. In exchange, these companies received a release with respect to any claims by the states relating to the use, sale, distribution, manufacture, development, advertising, marketing, or health effects of tobacco products. 112 Non-Participating Manufacturers are defined by the MSA as any tobacco companies that are not Participating Manufacturers. 113 They remain subject to potential claims by the states relating to their tobacco products. 114 The Non-Participating Manufacturers are not bound, however, by the settlement agreement's payment provisions or other obligations. 115 At the time of the MSA, Participating Manufacturers held approximately 99.6% of the domestic cigarette market share. 116 The NPM Adjustment was intended to compensate Participating Manufacturers if they lost market share to Non-Participating 112. MSA § § II(nn), at 13-14, XII(a), at 110-17. 113. MSA § II(cc), at 9. 114. MSA § XVIII(t), at 138. 115. Even though NPMs do not have to make MSA payments, they are subject in all forty-six MSA states to legislation requiring them to pay into a twenty-five-year escrow amounts comparable to the MSA payments imposed on Participating Manufacturers. MSA Exhibit T, at T-4 to T-5. These funds are available to the states in the event that the states elect to pursue claims against the NPMs for the damages caused by their cigarettes, including any health care costs for treating smoking-related illnesses. See MSA Exhibit T, at T-4 (explaining that escrow funds can be payable for either judgment or settlement amounts). Manufacturers as a result of the competitive disadvantages caused by the MSA's payment obligations and marketing restrictions. 117 
ii. Operation of the NPM Adjustment
The NPM Adjustment applies to the Participating Manufacturers' annual payment obligations for any year in which the following conditions are met:
(1) the Participating Manufacturers, in the aggregate, lose at least 2% of their pre-MSA market share to Non-Participating Manufacturers; 118 (2) the aggregate number of cigarettes shipped by certain Participating Manufacturers for the year in question is less than the number of cigarettes shipped by those same companies for the year before they entered into the MSA; 119 and (3) a "nationally recognized firm of economic consultants" determines that the MSA was a "significant factor" in causing the Participating Manufacturers' market share loss for the year in question. 120 The first two criteria not only create an incentive for the states to maintain cigarette sales, but could also motivate the states to enact policies favoring Participating Manufacturers over Non-Participating Manufacturers. 121 Despite those incentives, the Participating Manufacturers' market share has been at least 2% below their pre-MSA market share for every year since 2000. 122 In addition, the number of cigarettes shipped by the Participating Manufacturers has declined as compared to their pre-MSA shipment volumes every year since the MSA became effective. 123 The suffer up to a 16.66% market share loss, the NPM Adjustment trebles the reduction in MSA payments. 125 To illustrate, for a year in which the Participating Manufacturers' Market Share Loss equals 5%, the NPM Adjustment will reduce their MSA payments by 15%. If the Market Share Loss exceeds 16.66%, then the amount of the NPM Adjustment is determined according to a more complicated formula found in the MSA. 126 This formula results in less than a treble reduction, but still more than the proportional reduction of the Volume Adjustment. 127 Thus, while the Volume Reduction motivates the states to protect cigarette sales, the NPM Adjustment substantially increases that motivation because of the multiplying effect of the NPM Adjustment formula.
iii. The Current NPM Adjustment Controversy
Based on a report from the National Association of Attorneys General, the Participating Manufacturers lost market share and shipment volume for years 2003 through 2008 in amounts sufficient to render them eligible for up to $5.3 billion of NPM Adjustments. 128 Before receiving those adjustments, however, the prerequisite of a "significant factor determination" must be made.
The MSA states that "a nationally recognized firm of economic consultants (the 'Firm') shall determine whether the disadvantages experienced as a result of the provisions of this Agreement were a significant factor contributing to the Market Share Loss for the year in question. have not yet received any refund for the payments they made in those years. This is because the states contend that they are immune from the NPM Adjustment for those years based on a provision in the MSA known as a "diligent enforcement" provision. 133 In short, under the diligent enforcement provision, an individual state's MSA payment "shall not be subject to an NPM Adjustment" if that state "diligently enforced" a particular state statute, known as a "Qualifying Statute," for the years in question. 134 The MSA required the states to pass Qualifying Statutes in order to level the competitive playing field between Participating Manufacturers and Non-Participating Manufacturers. 135 The diligent enforcement defense applies on a state-by-state basis. 136 In other words, some states may have diligently enforced their Qualifying Statutes, while others may not have. Only those states that diligently enforced their Qualifying Statutes will benefit from the protection of the diligent enforcement provision.
The states and Participating Manufacturers have been ordered to arbitrate the question of whether the states diligently enforced their Qualifying Statutes. 137 The outcome of the arbitration proceedings will determine whether the states have to repay billions of previous MSA payments to the Participating Manufacturers. 138 
iv. Allocation of the NPM Adjustment-A Possible Total Elimination of a State's MSA Payment
Because of the diligent enforcement provision, the MSA does not necessarily allocate the NPM Adjustment among the states in a pro rata fashion. In other words, if the NPM Adjustment reduces the Participating Manufacturers' MSA payments by 15%, that does not mean that every state will necessarily see a 15% reduction in its MSA revenues. Some states might suffer no reduction, while others could lose their entire MSA payment. This is because if a state has diligently enforced its Qualifying Statute, its share of the NPM Adjustment is reallocated among the other states. 139 This reallocation could result in the total elimination of some states' MSA payments, at least for the year in which the NPM Adjustment applies, and possibly longer. To illustrate, consider an example in which a single state, New York, fails to prove that it diligently enforced its Qualifying Statute for the year in which an NPM Adjustment applies. Assume that for the year in question the amount of the MSA payment before application of the NPM Adjustment is $8 billion, and the Market Share Loss for that year is 5%. As explained above, assuming that the other requirements for the NPM Adjustment are met, the NPM Adjustment for that year would be 15%. This means that the NPM Adjustment Percentage would reduce the MSA payments going to the states for that year by $1.2 billion (15% of $8 billion). New York usually receives about 12.76% of the annual MSA payments. 140 Absent application of the NPM Adjustment, New York would receive $1,020,800,000 of the $8 billion payment. With the reallocation of the NPM Adjustment based on the determination that all states other than New York diligently enforced their NPM escrow statutes, however, the entire NPM Adjustment for the year in question would fall solely on New York. New York's total MSA payment for that year would be wiped out; rather than receiving $1,020,800,000, New York would receive $0. 141 This extreme result obviously provides a strong incentive for the states to diligently enforce their Qualifying Statutes. It also heightens the alignment of interests between the states and the tobacco companies to prevent the prerequisites to the NPM Adjustment-Market Share Loss by Participating Manufacturers and reduced cigarette volume shipments-from occurring in the first place.
IV. BREAKING THE ALIGNMENT OF INTERESTS
The extent of the states' incentive to continue the sale of harmful products is amplified in the tobacco context because of the multiplier effect and allocation method of the NPM Adjustment. To a lesser degree, however, that incentive exists in all sin tax contexts. That is because, as with the Volume Adjustment under the MSA, a reduction in the sales of a product subject to a sin tax necessarily means a reduction in state revenues. This is the case whether the taxed product is cigarettes or sodas. Once a state has become dependent on sin tax revenues generated from the sale of the harmful product, the state has intertwined its financial interests with the product's manufacturers in continuing sales of the harmful product.
There are at least two means of breaking this alignment of interests that state legislatures should consider when enacting or increasing sin taxes. One is to earmark the revenues from sin taxes so that those revenues are limited to combating the harmful effects caused by the taxed product. The second is to securitize the sin tax revenue stream.
140. See MSA Exhibit A, at A-1 (setting forth "State Allocation Percentages" of MSA payments that each state receives).
141. The MSA is silent as to whether the "excess" NPM Adjustment for the year in question (in this example the remaining $179,200,000 (= $1,200,000,000 -1,020,800,000)) would be applied against New York's MSA payment in subsequent years until the excess is fully used or whether the excess "expires" unused. Cf. MSA § IX(d)(2)(D), at 64-65 (applying excess NPM adjustment to other states' MSA payments until balance is zero).
A. Earmarking Sin Tax Revenues
"Earmarking means designating some or all of the collections from a specific tax or revenue source for a specific expenditure, with the intent that the designation will continue into the future." 142 Earmarking sin tax revenues so that they are used to address the harmful effects of the taxed product would break the connection between the states' and the manufacturers' financial interests. This is because if tax revenues are so earmarked and use of the harmful product declines due to prevention programs, for example, the state's need for the revenue generated by the sale of the product would also decline. In effect, earmarking prevents states from becoming dependent on sin tax revenues to fund government activities unrelated to the use of the taxed product.
For example, if cigarette taxes and MSA revenues were earmarked primarily to fund smoking cessation and prevention programs, and to pay for the treatment of health care problems associated with tobacco use, then a decline in smoking could be absorbed more readily by the state because the need for those funds would naturally decline as cigarette sales decreased. With less smoking, there would be fewer smokingrelated illnesses and therefore less need for cigarette tax revenues to fund cessation and health programs. Similarly, if revenues from a newly enacted tax on high-sugar drinks were spent on health care issues such as obesity, diabetes, and other harms caused by consumption of the drinks, then a decline in consumption of high-sugar drinks would not adversely affect the state's financial interests since the need for the tax revenue would also decline. By devoting the use of sin tax funds in this way, states would decouple their financial interests from those of the producer of the taxed product. Policymakers could pursue policies to reduce use of the harmful product, like the funding of cessation and prevention programs, without a concern over the impact of such policies to the state's fiscal health.
The prevalence of earmarking varies from state to state. As of 2005, all states earmarked some percentage of their total tax collections to various government programs, ranging from a low of 4.4% in Rhode Island to a high of 84.0% in Alabama. 143 With respect to tobacco taxes specifically, twenty-six states earmarked some or all of their tax revenues. 144 The amount and use of the earmarked tobacco taxes varied greatly from state to state. For example, Vermont earmarked 100% of its tobacco tax revenue toward indigent health care. 145 Arkansas, on the other hand, earmarked only 2.5% of its cigarette tax revenue, which went entirely to its Meals on Wheels and elderly transportation programs. 146 To break the alignment of financial interests between the states and the producers of the taxed product, legislatures should earmark sin tax revenues to programs that address the use of and problems caused by the product. Earmarking revenues for even worthy programs unrelated to the taxed product may create or exacerbate the conflict of interest between the state's desire to protect its citizens' health and its need to maintain tax revenues. For example, using tobacco tax revenues to finance school construction is a worthy use of the funds, but keeps the state dependent on their continued receipt.
Of course, with respect to the existing sin tax on tobacco, it may be unrealistic to expect earmarking alone to address the conflict of interest since so many states have already become dependent on revenues from the sales of tobacco products to fund a broad range of government services and programs. Moreover, even if sin taxes are enacted on previously untaxed products, proponents have proposed these taxes less for their ameliorative health effects and more for the much-needed money that they can bring to the states. 147 Earmarking sin taxes exclusively to combat the problems created by the taxed product would be ideal, but it may not be realistic given the states' pressing financial needs. Recognizing this reality, the next section discusses an alternative means that some states might use to at least mitigate the conflict of interest created by dependence on sin tax revenue: securitization.
"Securitization" means "selling the expected cash flows from an asset in exchange for a large, single, upfront" payment. 148 Some states have securitized their MSA payments by issuing bonds backed by future MSA payments. 149 While securitization has been subject to substantial criticism from health advocates, it can serve to break the alignment of interests between the states and the tobacco companies by shifting the risk of a decline in cigarette sales away from the states and to bondholders.
New York City became the first government entity to securitize its MSA payments in 1999. 150 Since then at least twenty states (and numerous counties in New York and California) have securitized some or all of their MSA payments. 151 Bond issuances backed by MSA payments have ranged in size from a low of $58 million (Arkansas) 152 up to $5.5 billion (Ohio). 153 States have used the cash infusion from the sale of MSA-backed tobacco bonds for various purposes, including to fund health care, education, and infrastructure projects, as well as to cover budget deficits. 154 The decision to securitize MSA payments has been controversial. Critics argue that the states get far too little money in exchange for the stream of future MSA payments that they sell, with investors and investment bankers getting the benefit of the deal. 155 Opponents of securitization contend that in most instances the lump sum payments received by the states have been used for short-term fiscal needs, like dealing with immediate budget shortfalls, rather than longer-term investments aimed at improving health, like smoking prevention programs and medical care. 156 Critics also rail against the significant transaction costs associated with securitization. 157 Finally, they argue that it is poor public policy to sell a long-term income stream to fix a shortterm problem like a budget shortfall. 158 Proponents of tobacco bonds have argued that securitization is a way to eliminate, or at least reduce, the risk states otherwise face that MSA payments may decline or altogether cease in the future. 159 Due to the various adjustments in the MSA, such as the Volume Adjustment and the NPM Adjustment, the amount of MSA payments could drop sharply if cigarette sales continue to decrease and Non-Participating Manufacturers gain more market share. 160 In addition, various risk factors-including significant litigation exposure-could drive one or more of the major Participating Manufacturers into bankruptcy, thereby rendering them unable to make future MSA payments. 161 Advocates for securitization argue that by securitizing MSA payments the states can reallocate these risks to the bondholders. 162 Securitization also allows the states to receive a substantial lump sum of cash at one time, which may open up otherwise unavailable policy options such as financing capital improvements or undertaking other capital-intensive projects.
In order to securitize their MSA payments, states typically establish a specialpurpose entity, sell the rights to future MSA payments to the entity, and then have the entity issue the bonds to investors. 163 The cash received from the investors is then paid by the special-purpose entity to the state in consideration for the entity's acquisition of the MSA payment rights from the state. 164 This arrangement helps to insulate the states from liability in the event that the tobacco companies fail to make their MSA payments, causing a default on bond payments. In addition, the bond indenture documents typically contain an express disclaimer of any liability for the state if the tobacco companies fail to make their MSA payments for any reason. 166 states that have issued bonds secured by MSA payments have shifted the risk of default by the tobacco companies on their MSA payments away from the states and to the bondholders. 167 This allows the states that have securitized their payments to pursue policies aimed at reducing smoking without as much concern over the loss of needed revenues. 165. MICH. CIRCULAR, supra note 130, at S-4 to S-5 (emphasis added). 166. In at least two instances, market conditions at the time of bond issuances required states to include in their offerings an assurance to bondholders that if MSA payments by the tobacco companies were insufficient to satisfy the bond obligations, the governor would request that the states' legislative bodies allocate money necessary to pay the bonds. E.g., CAL. CIRCULAR, supra note 163, at 3; N.Y. CIRCULAR, supra note 164, at S-2; see also Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 920-25 (2003) (discussing states' use of "subject-toappropriation" debt to avoid constitutional limitations on debt issuance).
167. While the legal documents relating to the tobacco bond issuances usually place the risk of default on the bondholders, at least one author suggests that states may elect to make bond payments in the event of default in order to avoid a lower credit rating and higher borrowing costs in the future. See Teresa Dondlinger Trissell, Note, Derivative Use in Tax-Exempt Financing, 48 TAX LAW. 1021, 1028 (1995) (describing how Texas's promises to make bond payments created expectations that Texas would pay municipal bond when it had no obligation to do so to maintain double-A rating).
Extending securitization beyond the MSA to other sin tax revenues would help address the conflict of interest created by states' increasing dependence on sin taxes as a source for financing government operations and programs. Like MSA payments, sin taxes provide an annual revenue stream. This revenue stream can be valued and securitized. 168 Admittedly, future sin tax revenues may be somewhat more difficult to predict than MSA payments, because sin tax revenues are based on consumer decisions whether to purchase the taxed product rather than a contractual obligation (as with the MSA). As previously discussed, however, sin taxes typically apply to products with relatively inelastic demand and therefore relatively stable revenue streams. 169 Moreover, MSA payments have been successfully securitized despite the fact that the amount actually paid each year may differ significantly from the annual Base Payment Amount due to the numerous potential adjustments, including the Volume and NPM Adjustments. 170 Therefore, the existence of some uncertainty over the exact amount of future revenues for a particular sin tax should not prevent a state from securitizing at least a portion of the tax's projected revenues.
To decouple a state's financial interests from the interests of manufacturers of the taxed product, the bond indenture securitizing sin tax revenues should specify that the bond is a revenue bond backed solely by receipts from the securitized sin tax, and not a general obligation bond. 171 States can successfully protect themselves from liability by expressly limiting the source of recovery for bond payments to a specified revenue stream. 172 By issuing bonds backed solely by a sin tax revenue stream, states can shift the risk of reduced sin tax receipts away from themselves and to their bondholders. In this manner, the states would break (or at least reduce) the alignment of interest with the producers of the "sinful" product, and allow for the pursuit of policies consistent with their citizens' interests rather than policies tied to the financial welfare of the product manufacturer.
V. CONCLUSION
A state's dependence on sin tax revenues creates a perverse incentive for the state to protect the continued sale of harmful products to its citizens. Perhaps this was most starkly illustrated in April 2003, after a state court judge in Madison County, Illinois ruled against Philip Morris in a consumer fraud case and ordered the tobacco giant to pay $10 billion in damages. 173 The court required the company to post a $12 billion bond to appeal the damage award. 174 Philip Morris responded by notifying state attorneys general that the bond requirement created uncertainty over whether the company would be able to make its $2.6 billion MSA payment obligation due on April 15, 2003. 175 Fearing a possible disruption in their MSA payments, the attorneys general from thirty-seven states and territories joined together to submit an amicus brief requesting the Illinois court to reduce the bond requirement. 176 The attorneys general argued that "many State programs, including vital public health programs, depend on MSA payments for their support" and urged the court "to exercise its discretion to set an appeal bond that does not interfere with the States' vital interests." 177 The brief also stated that "if Philip Morris fails to make its $2.6 billion payment to the States on April 15, 2003, the States face a substantial, immediate, and unexpected revenue shortfall." 178 The Illinois court subsequently lowered the bond requirement to $800 million in cash and a $6 billion note. 179 Following this scare over a possible default on MSA payments, several states enacted statutes capping the maximum amount for an appeal bond in tobacco-related cases. 180 The states' dependence on tobacco revenues had caused them to join sides with the nation's largest tobacco company in an effort to protect their joint financial interests.
This would not have happened if the states had done what they promised at the outset of the MSA-used the settlement revenues for tobacco control programs. Instead, the states' reliance on MSA payments to fund general government programs and operations forced the states to advocate on behalf of the nation's largest cigarette producer. Moreover, if all of the states had securitized their MSA revenues and shifted
